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view here, and these are all serious scholars who have
thought about these issues for a long time (and in some
cases, for a very long time, including pioneers of the
field in Warren and Lapian’s cases).  The book is how-
ever slightly uneven, as I have described above, with
perhaps too much attention paid to Insular Southeast
Asia, and too little paid to Japanese and Korean waters
(where are the wako, for example?), and the long out-
stretched coasts of the Southeast Asian mainland.
 Presumably to fit into the book’s title, some attention
should have been paid to Indian Ocean piracy as well, of 
which there was plenty, and which still (of course) exists
even now, though on a smaller scale than in previous
centuries. I would recommend this book to anyone who
wants to see strong, solid scholarship on the notion of 
piracy in Asian waters, and a number of the essays  really
do fit very well together in sets (on Sulu; on the Outer
Islands of Indonesia; and on the Sino-Vietnamese fron-
tier, for example).  The book — already useful — might
have been still stronger, however, had it aimed a bit
more for geographic inclusion in its contributions, so
that more territory could have been covered.  This
would make an already-utilitarian volume, impressive
in many ways in its own right, even more of a contribu-
tion to a field that only seems to be growing year after
year.
(Eric Tagliacozzo · Cornell University)
Duncan McCargo.  Tearing Apart the Land: Islam
and Legitimacy in Southern Thailand.  Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 2008, 264 p.
This well-written and researched book provides a
much-needed detailed analysis of the violent conflicts
in three Malay-Muslim provinces of southern Thailand
— Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat.  The author, one of the
most prolific scholars of Thai politics, challenges two
commonly evoked explanations that attribute the con-
flicts to primordial ethno-religious differences and to
region-wide or global terrorist “Jihad” networks.  McCargo
argues, instead, that the violence is fundamentally a
somehow strangely out of place here.
Part III, the last section of the book, then brings up
the rear with fully seven essays on “Southeast Asia.”
All of this literature concentrates on the island world of 
Southeast Asia, and there is almost nothing here on the
long outstretched coasts of Burma, Siam, and Cambodia,
for example, and also little on the Malay Peninsula.  This
is a lacuna which should have been filled, likely, so the
book might have had better balance.  While it’s true that
there is less literature on these coasts, and that piracy
may have been practiced less here, too, than in the
 Insular world of Southeast Asia, this lack of material
gives the book a feeling of slightly skewed orientation.
I should be clear that the essays that are indeed here
are very good ones; these are the main authors in the
field, and the work that they exhibit here is nuanced and
complex.  Adri Lapian talks about piracy in Indonesian
waters generally in his piece, and then Gerrit Knaap,
Esther Velthoen, and Carolin Liss all discuss variations of
piracy across several time periods in Papua, Sulawesi,
and Sabah respectively.  All are accomplished essays,
which provide a very good balance between hard data
and conception on the how’s and why’s of piracy work-
ing in these far-flung locales. Three other essays then
problematize these ideas even further, as James Warren,
Stefan Eklof Amirell, and Ikuya Tokoro all examine
 different avatars of the subject in one place, the Sulu
Basin at the southern end of the Philippines.  These
essays too are accomplished, each and every one, with
much that is new on display, as the Sulu Sea is dis-
sected vis-à-vis its maritime dynamics from colonial to
post-colonial to “ethnographic” time, and across the
centuries.  It is very helpful to have these three essays
together here, in fact, because one can see how various
methodologies can be used to describe the same place,
and how piracy looks different according to the tools
being used in one’s own study.
Pirates, Ports, and Coasts in Asia is a good book,
and more than this it is a useful compendium which
repays a serious reading and careful consideration of its
contents.  Many of the world’s academic experts on
Asian piracy, both historical and contemporary, are on
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insight that Islam itself is not the cause of violent con-
flicts; rather, Islam constitutes a convenient rhetorical
resource that a handful of hatemongering militant leaders
have tapped or manipulated to mobilize local youths
behind their violent cause.  McCargo bases all these
arguments on a wealth of previously untapped materials
(e.g., militants’ confessions, leaflets circulated by mili-
tants, numerous interviews).  This book makes a valu-
able contribution to the existing literature that only
scratches the surface of the violent conflict in southern
Thailand.
With this contribution duly acknowledged, how-
ever, the book leaves several things to be desired.  First,
McCargo’s explanation lacks sufficient historical depth,
focusing preponderantly on the Thaksin era, especially
on the period after January 2004.  This temporal focus
is puzzling, given McCargo’s contention that the conflict
has deep roots in “historical and political grievances”
(p. 188,  emphasis mine).  He bases his whole argument
on the assumption that the Thai state’s rule over the
Malay-Muslim provinces “has long lacked legitimacy”
(p. 183), but this assumption is asserted, rather than
well demonstrated through a longitudinal analysis of 
various events, state policies, and politicians (both
 national- and local-level) that have been involved in the
region over the century.  Characteristic of McCargo’s
ahistorical analysis is his cursory discussion of the Prem
Tinsulanond’s administration (1980–88).  Prem, according
to McCargo, only offered conciliatory policies without
granting Malay-Muslims full participatory rule.  The
“carrot” helped contain the insurgency, but local dis-
content kept simmering underneath the surface, which
erupted in violence after Thaksin attained power.  The
reader is not told how ordinary Muslims perceived
Prem’s various policies (e.g., the “New Hope” initiative
taken in the 1980s to develop the Malay-Muslim prov-
inces) or how their negative views of the state were
stoked and sustained by local-level political or religious
elites.  Another important neglected issue is the
 Bangkok-based prostitution rings that thrived in border
areas — notably in Sungai Kolok of Narathiwat — in the
1980s–90s and proved highly unpopular with Malay-
political problem that stems from the fact that the
 Malay-Muslim population has never accepted the
 legitimacy — the moral right to rule — of the Bangkok-
based Buddhist–majority state.
Specifically, McCargo analyzes the illegitimacy of 
the Thai state from three angles: religion, politics, and
security.  First, he argues that the state has made con-
scious efforts to neutralize or fragment the authority of 
local Islamic leaders.  These leaders, who are supposed
to champion Malay-Muslims’ interests, have been
coopted into the state in return for material induce-
ments.  At the same time, traditional Islamic schools
(pondok) have been placed under the control of the state
in exchange for government subsidies.  Consequently,
ordinary Malay-Muslims have lost the “moral and
 spiritual center” in their communities (p. 52).  Second,
the Thai state has made similar moves to “coopt and
control” the local Malay-Muslim political elites (p. 183).
Several elites, such as Den Tohmeena and Wan
 Muhammad Nor Matha, have attained key cabinet posi-
tions since the 1980s, but this is, according to McCargo,
a cosmetic measure taken by the state to appease the
otherwise discontented Malay-Muslim population.  Far
from serving as vital links between the local and the
center, those politicians have spent most of their time
in Bangkok or have enriched themselves by collaborat-
ing with Bangkok-based political elites.  As a result, the
political (as well as religious) authority in Malay-Muslim
communities has been weakened and divided by the
state.  Finally, Thai security forces have consistently
displayed “a lamentable catalogue of criminal blunders,
negligence, incompetence, lack of coordination, and
sheer misdirection” (p. 133), as exemplified by the
 tragedies of Kru-Ze and Tak Bai.  The post-Thaksin
military-led government apologized for the past
 atrocities or repression, but failed to bring the security
personnel involved to justice.
Under these circumstances that render the central
state illegitimate, militant leaders, such as Ustadz Soh,
have found ample room for maneuver in exploiting the
Malay-Muslims’ pent-up anti-state grievances for their
political ends.  Here McCargo provides an important
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it provides draws primarily on Mohammed Hafez’s
work without addressing the voluminous literature on
insurgency and communal violence.  How does the Thai
case illuminate this literature? Similarly, McCargo un-
fortunately fails to cast the Thai case in comparative
perspective.  The existing literature, he laments, is
“highly case specific” without offering “systematic com-
parative perspectives” (p. 10).  This critique can be
turned against him, too.  Is the Thai case similar to, or
different from, other cases of insurgency movements
or communal conflicts in countries like India, Indonesia,
and the Philippines?  It is a pity that he does not address
these cases, for he presents an unparalleled amount of 
empirical materials.
These comments notwithstanding, McCargo has
produced just another “must” book for anybody inter-
ested in Thai politics.  The way he situates the violent
conflicts in the nature of interaction between the center
and periphery is particularly illuminating.  This book
sets the bar high for those currently working on the
important topic of Muslim insurgency in southern Thai-
land.
(Yoshinori Nishizaki; 西崎義則 · Department of 
















Muslims for undermining the morality of their commu-
nities.  Short on a deeply historical analysis of these
(and other) issues, the book may give the false impres-
sion that Thaksin’s “regime” (as opposed to the “state”
— McCargo tends to conflate the two concepts) is
largely to blame for the upsurge in violence.
Contrary to its claims, the book also takes a rather
simplistic view of state “legitimacy.” Every state enjoys
varying degrees of legitimacy in different policy areas
and at different points in time.  In McCargo’s formula-
tion, however, Malay-Muslims seem to have viewed the
Thai state as illegitimate across board and across time.
On issues of security, religious education, and political
recruit ment, the state may be illegitimate (as McCargo
claims), but what about other schemes, such as social
welfare, infrastructure development, and scholarships,
from which a sizeable number of Malay-Muslims have
benefited, albeit to varying degrees, over the years?
These issues are not explored in the book.
The book, moreover, tends to make a jump from
state illegitimacy to the occurrence and persistence of 
violent conflicts.  According to McCargo, the militant
movement has now found many active and passive sym-
pathizers in the Malay-Muslim population.  In some
areas, they “constitute more than half or two-thirds of 
the population” (p. 186).  But it is unclear why these
people support or condone the violent movement, given
the fact that it has attacked innocent civilian Muslims in
recent years.  Seeing the state as illegitimate is one
thing, but supporting the use of violence is another.  If 
many Malay-Muslims view the state as illegitimate,
they should view the violent movement as equally
 illegitimate.  My educated guess (based on my brief stay
in the three border provinces) is that most ordinary
Malay-Muslims are willing, if not totally happy, to be
part of the Thai nation-state.  They remain neutral
 between the state and violent conflicts; they support
neither side.  They may oppose some types of  “regimes”
(e.g., Thaksin), but they do not necessarily shun the
“state” altogether.
Finally, the book provides little theoretical and
comparative analysis.  What little theoretical discussion
